Here is the updated text of a talk I gave to the University of Iowa Anti-War Committee (UIAC) on Oct 23, 2008 and to the Iowa International Socialist Organization on July 21, 2009:
For many people, including many who opposed the war in Iraq, Afghanistan is the good war, the one that Iraq was a distraction from, the war that liberated Afghanis from the brutal rule of the Taliban, the war to end terror.
Yet, if you look closely, it becomes obvious that this war is in fact every bit as evil and terrible as the war in Iraq. The real objectives are not ending terror or bringing democracy or liberating anyone. The US and NATO are in Afghanistan in order to control a key strategic area. The antiwar movement needs to oppose not only the conduct of this war, but its aims as well.
Earlier this month a major offensive was launched into Western Afghanistan as part of Obama’s new war strategy. Reuters reports that
Soldiers are now dying at rates nearing the worst suffered during the war in Iraq. July had already become the deadliest month of the war for all foreign troops with well over 50 killed . . . At least 27 U.S. soldiers have been killed in combat so far in July, according to U.S. military figures, more than in any other month of the eight-year-old war. The previous highest monthly total was 26 killed in September last year.
This current offensive is in reality an extension of a “surge” that began in 2007. Anand Gopal describes the development of this surge :
Then, a growing insurgency was causing visible problems for U.S. and NATO forces in certain pockets in the southern parts of the country, long a Taliban stronghold. In response, military planners dramatically beefed up the international presence, raising the number of troops over the following 18 months by 20,000, a 45% jump.
During this period, however, the violence also jumped — by 50%. This shouldn’t be surprising. More troops meant more targets for Taliban fighters and suicide bombers. In response, the international forces retaliated with massive aerial bombing campaigns and large-scale house raids. The number of civilians killed in the process skyrocketed. In the fifteen months of this surge, more civilians have been killed than in the previous four years combined.
The number of civilians killed or harmed by air raids also increased dramatically. According to a Recent Human Rights Watch Report :
In 2007, Afghan civilian deaths were nearly three times higher: In 2007, more Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes than by US and NATO ground fire. In the first seven months of 2008, the latest period for which data is available, at least 119 Afghan civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes.
There has been a massive and unprecedented surge in the use of airpower in Afghanistan in 2008. In response to increased insurgent activity, twice as many tons of bombs were dropped in 2007 than in 2006. In 2008, the pace has increased: in the months of June and July alone the US dropped approximately as much as it did in all of 2006.
Airstrikes have caused significant destruction of civilian property, and have also forced civilians to flee and vacate villages, adding to the internally displaced population of Afghanistan. In every case investigated by Human Rights Watch where airstrikes hit villages, many civilians left the village because of damage to their homes but also because of fear of further strikes. People from neighboring villages also sometimes fled in fear of future strikes on their villages. They have also had significant political impact, outraging public opinion in Afghanistan and undermining public confidence in both the Afghan government and its international backers.
Civilian casualties hit record high in Afghan conflict in 2008, according to a U.N. report. Insurgents killed 1,160 civilians while Afghan and coalition troops killed 828 civilians. While the US military claims it is implementing a new policy to reduce the number of civilian casualties, deaths of Afghan civilians are likely to increase as a result of this new offensive. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 800 Afghan civilian deaths between January and May 2009.
Despite the fact that Taliban is responsible for 55 percent of reported civilian causalities, Afghanis “generally don’t express the same outrage toward Taliban tactics as they do toward Western ones.” Why? David Whitehouse argues that
In any case, Taliban tactics send a different message to Afghans than Western tactics do. Taliban tactics demonstrate that they’re willing to die to expel the foreign troops, while Western tactics show that Western forces are willing to kill Afghans in order to avoid exposing themselves to harm. The contrast between these two messages is insulting to Afghans, and it undermines the very pretext for the Western presence—the idea that foreign troops are necessary to bring Afghans the humanitarian help they need. How can Western motives be humanitarian when the foreigners clearly care more about their own lives than they do about the lives of Afghans?
All this contributes to support for insurgency. Tariq Ali observs “While Bush and Karzai blame Pakistan the occupation itself has been the main recruiting sergeant. If a second-generation Taliban is now growing and creating new alliances it is not because its sectarian religious practices have become popular, but because it is the only available umbrella for national liberation.”
Since the beginning of the year, the expansion of the war has into Pakistan also continues. The New York Times reports that Obama is “continuing, and in some cases extending, Bush administration policy” of extending unmanned drone attacks against targets along the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border. U.S. Special Forces soldiers are now training Pakistani troops. In addition to military action, the U.S. is running a diplomatic surge into the region. A giant embassy on the scale of the one in Baghdad is in the works for Pakistan while the embassy in Kabul is to be expanded.
The US and NATO are planning for the long haul. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs , Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and current special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, insisted “as the war enters its eighth year, Americans should be told the truth: it will last a long time–longer than the United States’ longest war to date, the 14-year conflict (1961-75) in Vietnam.” According to Major General David Rodriguez, commander of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, stabilizing Afghanistan will need an international commitment lasting a generation.
So why is Afghanistan so important? Afghanistan provides the US with access to the Caspian region in central Asia known to hold significant reserves of oil and natural gas. Countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan become important as a means of building energy pipelines that bypass Russia and Iran. Afghanistan also sits at one end of an arc of military bases stretching from the Horn of Africa, through the Middle East, Turkey, and into South Asia. While oil and gas themselves are attractive for U.S. business interests, the larger prize for Washington is an ability to dominate the region militarily and politically. As Asia Times writer Pepe Escobar commented: “Oil and gas are not the U.S.’s ultimate aim. It’s about control… If the U.S. controls the energy resources of its rivals–Europe, Japan, China and other nations aspiring to be more independent–they win.”
Tariq Ali notes the important role Afghanistan plays for NATO:
Herein lie the reasons for the near-unanimity among Western opinion-makers that the occupation must not only continue but expand—‘many billions over many years’. They are to be sought not in the mountain fastnesses of Afghanistan, but in Washington and Brussels. As the Economist summarizes, ‘Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but’—and more importantly, of course—‘to the nato alliance’. [24] As ever, geopolitics prevails over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers. The basing agreement signed by the us with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity, potentially including nuclear missiles. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of ‘democratization and good governance’ was made clear by nato’s Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Brookings Institution in February this year: a permanent nato presence in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran and Pakistan was too good to miss.
More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for reconstituting, and extending, the West’s power-political grip on the world order. It provides, first, an opportunity for the us to shrug off problems in persuading its allies to play a broader role in Iraq. As Obama and Clinton have stressed, America and its allies ‘have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of nato’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan and us leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington’s ability to shape nato’s future.’ [26] Beyond this, it is the rise of China that has prompted nato strategists to propose a vastly expanded role for the Western military alliance. Once focused on the Euro-Atlantic area, a recent essay in nato Review suggests, ‘in the 21st century nato must become an alliance founded on the Euro-Atlantic area, designed to project systemic stability beyond its borders.’
So what are the consequences for the people of Afghanistan? Christian Science Monitor reporter Anand Gopal paints a grim picture:
Afghanistan is now one of the poorest countries on the planet. It takes its place among desperate, destitute nations like Burkina Faso and Somalia whenever any international organization bothers to measure. The official unemployment rate, last calculated in 2005, was 40% percent. According to recent estimates, it may today reach as high as 80% in some parts of the country.
Approximately 45% of the population is now unable to purchase enough food to guarantee bare minimum health levels, according to the Brookings Institution. This winter, Afghan officials claim that hunger may kill up to 80% of the population in some northern provinces caught in a vicious drought. Reports are emerging of parents selling their children simply to make ends meet. In one district of the southern province of Ghazni last spring things got so bad that villagers started eating grass. Locals say that after a harsh winter and almost no food, they had no choice.
Kabul itself lies in tatters. Roads have gone unpaved since 2001. Massive craters from decades of war blot the capital city. Poor Afghans live in crumbling warrens with no electricity and often without safe drinking water. Kabul, a city designed for about 800,000 people, now holds more than four million, mostly squeezed into informal settlements and squatters’ shacks.
Its hard to believe that life may be worse now for ordinary Afghans that it was under the Taliban. But it is worse and conditions continue to deteriorate:
The British charity Oxfam announced recently that the country is facing some of the worst conditions in more than 20 years. Nearly 5 million Afghans face severe food shortages, the agency estimates. More the 42 percent of the country lives in extreme poverty — less than 10 dollars per month — according to the Afghanistan Central Statistics Bureau. According to the Brookings institution, 45 percent of the country is experiencing food poverty. . .
The food shortages have fallen particularly hard on children. . . Oxfam estimates that nearly one million children are at serious risk. The United Nations Children’s Fund says that 20 percent of children fail to reach their fifth birthday because of malnutrition.
Only ten percent of Afghans have electricity “The main electricity supply is worse now than five years ago, and while the rich can use private generators to power their air conditioners, hot-water heaters, computers and satellite tvs, average Kabulis ‘suffered a summer without fans and face a winter without heaters.” Barnett Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January–February 2007.
“Beyond Kabul, things vary dramatically depending on where you go,” reports one journalist, “ In the parts of the country with the heaviest concentrations of US/NATO troops, Afghans are frequently rounded-up, detained, tortured, bombed, or shot by foreign troops just as in Iraq.”
“In other parts of the country, where the Taliban are strong; girls schools are blown up, civilians are killed in suicide bombings, and journalists, teachers, and elected officials are harassed or murdered. Those areas controlled by warlords are ruled with an iron hand, where extreme interpretations of sharia law rule the day, and women suffer rape and degradation” and “ No matter where you go in Afghanistan, there is utter, grinding poverty.”
The economy is so underdeveloped that opium production accounts for more than half of the country’s gross domestic product. “ The only sector in which Afghanistan has progressed is in drug cultivation and trafficking. “The four largest players in the heroin business are all senior members of the Afghan government,” the Daily Mail reported July 21, 2007. Tom Lasseter reports “Seven former Afghan governors and security commanders said they had firsthand knowledge of local or national officials who were transporting or selling drugs or protecting those who did.” According to UN estimates, narcotics account for 53 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, and the poppy fields continue to spread. Some 90 per cent of the world opium supply emanates from Afghanistan
So what about all that money spent on reconstruction? Where does it go? Most of it is what is called “phantom aid.” The funds go into the pockets of NGOs and corporations in donor countries:
Washington spends about $100 million a day on this war — close to $36 billion a year — but only five cents of every dollar actually goes towards aid. From this paltry sum, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief found that “a staggering 40 percent has returned to donor countries in corporate profits and salaries.” What little money does go for reconstruction is handed over to U.S. multinationals who then subcontract out to Afghan partners and cut corners every step of the way. As a result, the U.N. ranks the country as the fifth least-developed in the world — a one-position drop from 2004.
Simon Jenkins writes in the Guardian, “A reputed 10,000 ngo staff have turned Kabul into the Klondike during the gold rush, building office blocks, driving up rents, cruising about in armoured jeeps and spending stupefying sums of other people’s money, essentially on themselves. They take orders only from some distant agency, but then the same goes for the American Army, NATO the UN, the EU and the supposedly sovereign Afghan government.”
The rest of the aid goes to the corrupt officials who run Afghanistan. In 2006, Christian Parenti described the Afghani government as a:
. . . classic rentier state: an institution designed to capture revenue rather than deliver services and facilitate economic growth. Instead of oil, it feeds on the free flow of international aid, which accounts for 92 percent of the nation’s income. The government’s thirty-two ministries are massively overstaffed, with employees usually earning a mere $30-$100 a month. They sit in squalid offices drinking tea, reading newspapers and watching Bollywood films on TV.
Not surprisingly, they use their positions to demand bribes and peculate public funds. The modus operandi of the ministries is to deny access, deny permission, deny responsibility and sabotage those who might be effective at their job–in case they start capturing more of the aid flow.
This mess is largely the result of a US-led process that–in the lead-up to the Iraq War–sloppily fast-tracked Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Warlords were allowed to control the government and the United States signed off on ridiculous shakedown schemes like paying wages to militia commanders who wildly exaggerated their troop numbers. The result is a nonfunctional state that will probably never be able to “stand up” and allow the international community to successfully “stand down.”
Five years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Kabul has only three hours of electricity per day and unsanitary and inadequate drinking water. The healthcare system is nonexistent or run by foreign NGOs, and primary schools lack teachers. The government undertakes almost no public works; there is no food-safety system or program of agricultural extensions; state-owned industries–such as coal mines, gas works, cement factories, the national airline with its half-dozen planes, a chain of old hotels and several massive granaries–receive little or no investment.
To pay taxes in Kabul one must first bribe the tax collector! No bribe and your taxes (which will be stolen) won’t be registered as paid. Without proof of payment a homeowner or shopkeeper could be reported to the police, arrested and repeatedly extorted at every step of the legal process.
Even government offices bribe one another. “To get license plates for our cars we had to bribe the Transportation Ministry,” says Naqib, who runs nebulously defined “capacity-building workshops” at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. “We had to pay about $2,000.”
Some would blame this sorry state of affairs on racist notations of Afghan backwardness, the lack of international attention, or the legacy of the Taliban. In reality the current set up is the result of decades of foreign intervention motivated by geopolitics and imperial maneuvering rather than any concern about the lives of ordinary Afghanis. It is the logical outcome of an attempt to set up a government prepared to operate according to U.S. interests:
The U.S. set out to construct a client state, and nobody should be surprised if it operates by extortion, patronage, official corruption, and permanent insecurity. There is no other way to create a systematic alignment to a foreign power such as the U.S. except by reinforcing the way the local elite maintains the local disparities in wealth.
Afghanistan runs like the mafia because that’s the way imperialism is done. What’s more, Afghanistan is run like a set of competing mafias, relations that are perpetuated by an imperial competition between great powers to back one faction against the others. These crimes are built into the very foundation of Afghanistan as a buffer state, and the crimes have become more acute and devastating as the great powers have devoted more and more attention to it. The past thirty years of escalated foreign intervention have made the situation for Afghans worse and worse. Thirty years ago, many knew nothing of the outside world, but now they’ve gone through two imperial invasions, the Soviet and the American, and they’ve been introduced to international jihad. They didn’t have a cash economy, but now more than one out of seven of them are engaged in the opium business—and one out of twenty-seven is addicted. And thirty years ago, most were able to produce just a bare subsistence, but now one-third of Afghans—nine million—are facing acute food shortage this winter. This kind of deterioration serves as yet another sign that the real motivation of foreign interventions has had nothing to do with looking out for the welfare of Afghans
And what about the status of women in Afghanistan who US forces supposedly liberated? Shortly after the US invasion of Afghanistan began in October 2001, Laura Bush came on the air declaring “Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”
But, as the Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan (RAWA) asserts, by reinstalling the warlords of the Northern Alliance in power in Afghanistan, the US is ultimately replacing one oppressive fundamentalist regime with another.
The rates of self-immolation and suicide due to domestic violence and poverty, of forced marriages and violence against women are higher than ever. In the first six months of 2008, forty-seven cases of self-immolation among women were reported in a single hospital in the western city of Herat. Reports come every day of gang rapes of young girls, especially in the northern portion of Afghanistan, where pro-US warlords have full power and a free hand. But the rapists are not prosecuted. Last month President Hamid Karzai ordered the release of two men who were sentenced to eighteen years in prison for raping and killing a girl.
According to Sonali Kolhatkar, in an interview on Democracy Now! “Women are being imprisoned in greater numbers than ever before, for the crime of escaping from home or having, quote-unquote, ’sexual relations’–’illegal sexual relations.’ Most of these women are simply victims of rape.” Every 28 minutes a woman dies in Afghanistan during childbirth and 54 percent of Afghan children are born stunted.
As Kolhatkar points out, while women have political equality in the constitution, “ If you look at what happens on the ground, politically speaking, women who are in parliament, if they speak up, are completely attacked. “ One example is Malai Joya, a member of parliament who was banned for speaking out against the warlords. She has yet to be reinstated. Women in the government in the government must battle warlordism at every step. Afghani women face immense difficulties:
Even being allowed to run for parliament is a significant hurdle. Females in Afghanistan cannot leave their house and work unless their fathers, brothers and husbands give them permission. In most cases, female MPs are working in parliament only because a male relative has allowed them to do so.
The female lawmakers’ difficulties pale in comparison to those faced by ordinary Afghan women, women’s rights activists say. The women of the Afghan parliament are educated and wealthy, with lenient husbands and fathers, whereas most Afghan women are mired in poverty and are forbidden from leaving the home. “In this category, women are not even considered human beings (by men),” says Hasina Saafi, director of the Afghan Women’s Education Center, an NGO.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a study last week that found Afghanistan to be the second most unequal society in the world in terms of gender, ahead of only Sudan.
Supposedly the Obama administration is implementing a shift to more “nation buildling” and humanitarian assistance. Toru Shirakawa decribes one of these humanitarian missions:
I left the base with the humanitarian aid unit who said they were going to visit nearby houses. A protection unit accompanied us.
Though they call themselves doctors and vets, they look no different than combatants. They wear bulletproof vests and sunglasses. M16 rifles hang from their necks. Physicians who are supposed to be saving lives are carrying rifles. It is a strange spectacle.
“There’s a woman. Don’t come in.”
As they approach a house, a man of about forty, presumably its owner, is standing in the doorway. The eyes with which he looks at the US troops are extremely frightened.
“Please don’t come into the house. There’s a woman inside. Please stop.” The man firmly refuses the US army’s medical assistance.
The commanding officer persuades the man to yield, promising that only female soldiers will enter.
The female soldiers enter the house. The protection unit soldiers follow directly after them. This is not what was promised.
As I enter the premises, I see protection unit soldiers on the roof.
I tense up. Nearly all the people who live in the border region support the Taliban. The Taliban often use private houses as a base. If any Taliban are discovered, there might be a firefight.
Fortunately, the protection unit emerges from the house having found no one who looks like a combatant.
Medical treatment has been given, but it is a formality. The man, whose skin is dry, has been given cream.
“Sometimes we even bring an Afghan doctor from a hospital. The medicine’s free too. We show them that we can do what even the Taliban can’t.” The aid unit’s commanding officer looks triumphant.
As we leave the house, we see that soldiers from the protection unit have lined up the males of the house against a wall.
A soldier is holding what looks like a camera against a man’s face. The man’s eye is reflected in the apparatus lens.
“I’m taking a photo of his retina and data-basing it.”
I ask him what for, but the soldier says nothing more. According to what a British journalist familiar with army activities tells me later, it is so that when a Taliban fighter is captured they can check the data base and find out what village he is from. Evidently the data can also be useful for targeting air strikes.
David Whitehouse evaluates the Obama administration’s “new “ strategy :
Obama’s proposals represent a continuation of changes that are already underway in the post-Rumsfeld era. Obama is calling for an increase in U.S. troop levels from about 30,000 in the past year to as much as 50,000 in the next couple years, a buildup that has already begun. With this bigger “footprint,” he’s also calling for an increase in development aid, and peace talks with insurgents who are willing to recognize the Karzai government.
The first part—more troops—sounds like more war, while the second part—peace talks and humanitarian aid—sound like a plan for peace. They are all, in fact, parts of a single new war strategy. The Taliban have advanced largely at the expense of the smaller warlords in the South and East. The developing U.S. plan is to start from the Western-backed central state and build authority outwards to replace the warlords in those areas where the resistance has been able to advance. That doesn’t mean replacing the big warlords of the Northern Alliance, who are so influential in the regime and who haven’t lost nearly so much ground to the Taliban.
Development aid—the nation-building aspect of the plan—would go as a reward to local strongmen who collaborate with the war effort and pledge loyalty to the central government
Liberals thus envisage a vast expansion of operations on the model of the PRTs, which integrate military action with development projects. Any attempts at “nation-building” are to be shaped by the policy’s central aim—to extend the authority of the central state. Old clients are to be forced into fully subordinate relationships, and new clients are to be found where the old ones don’t cooperate. The promise of patronage is always to be coupled with the threat of violence, so the iron fist will keep coming down against those who don’t accept the occupiers’ terms.
Like the plan to reward war collaborators with targeted development contracts, peace talks form part of the new war strategy. The objective of the war has not changed. It’s not humanitarian assistance to Afghans, or the liberation of women, and it’s only loosely connected to the hunt for al-Qaeda. The objective is still the occupation itself. The U.S. aims to stay in this strategic location.
As an editorial in Socialist Worker argues “The “humanitarian-security” case made by the U.S. establishment needs to be rejected–just as the case for the occupation of Iraq has been rejected as a pack of lies to justify Washington’s drive to control oil resources and project its power throughout the Middle East.”
U.S. meddling—political, financial, and most importantly, military—has never been a benefit for ordinary Afghans. There is no reason to believe that it can or will be in the future.
Those forces in the antiwar movement that don’t include opposition to the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan are at risk of being made irrelevant by the dedication of increasing amounts of U.S. military firepower and personnel to the “good war. Failure to do so will mean that the further the occupation of Iraq fades in the media and from American political discussion, the more difficult it will get to mobilize sufficient numbers to compel the U.S. to exit both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Which is why we must reject the idea of Afghanistan as the good war and redouble our efforts to get the US out now.